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Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case
Earl M. Maltz*

In its October 1988 issue, 1 the Michigan Law Review published a
symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 2 a case in which the
Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether
Runyon v. Mccrary 3 should be overruled or modified. 4 Each of the
three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the
Court should not overrule Runyon. 5 In reaching this conclusion, Professor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heavily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of
the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doctrine of stare decisis should apply with particular force. 6 Although
their analyses significantly advance the debate on the role of precedent
in statutory interpretation, in my view their conclusions are incorrect.
One of the difficulties in dealing with Patterson is that more than
one precedent is actually involved in the case. The order of the Court
directed the parties only to consider Runyon, a 1976 decision which
held that 42 U.S.C. section 1981 prohibits private racial discrimination
in the making of contracts. In Runyon itself, however, the majority
concluded over strenuous dissent that the case was controlled by the
1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 7 which had held that 42
U.S.C. section 1982 prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale
of property. Thus, if one accepts the doctrine of passive congressional
acquiescence or reaffirmation generally, any congressional actions
taken after 1968 might be considered relevant. The two events that

* Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A. 1972, Northwestern; J.D. 1975,
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1. 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1988).
2. No. 87-107 (reargument, Oct. 26, 1988).
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam).
5. See Aleinikolf, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 65 (1988); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 108 (1988); Farber, Statutory
Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 19 (1988).
6. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 121-22; Farber, supra note 5, passim.
The question of the import of legislative inaction in the face of judicial interpretation of
statutes has been the subject of substantial scholarly commentary. See sources cited in Eskridge,
supra note 5, at 68-69 nn.9-10; Farber, supra note 5, at 9 n.33. My own views on the subject may
be found in Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 388-90 (1988).
7. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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could conceivably be viewed as expressing congressional approval of
Runyon are (1) the rejection of the Hruska amendment to the 1972
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 which would have made
that Act the exclusive remedy for racial discrimination, and (2) the
passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
("Fees Act").9
Eskridge's perceptive analysis of the rejection of the Hruska
amendment demonstrates that this action cannot be taken to be a congressional ratification of the Runyon holding in any meaningful
sense. 10 He argues, however, that the adoption of the Fees Act shows
"public reliance" on the Runyon Court's interpretation of section
1981. 11 In fact, the Fees Act is a classic example of the difficulties
inherent in the concept of congressional reliance on statutory
precedent.
Admittedly, when adopting the Fees Act, Congress did act against
the background assumption - based on Jones and Runyon - tha~
section 1981 prohibited private racial discrimination. Indeed, this assumption was explicitly included in the legislative history of the Fees
Act. 12 Reliance, however, requires more than simple belief in a fact or
state of affairs; it implies that the relevant belief had some impact on
the action taken. Put another way, to demonstrate reliance one would
have to show that Congress' alleged belief that section 1981 covered
private discrimination influenced the shape of the Fees Act.
In the context of the Fees Act, any such claim is totally implausible. The passage of the Fees Act was a direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 13
in which the Court held that in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, attorney's fees were not available to prevailing parties in actions
under federal law. This holding created something of an anomaly in
federal civil rights law; while attorney's fees were available by statute
in suits under provisions such as section 1983 and Title VII, no existing attorney's fees statutes were applicable to a variety of other civil
rights statutes including (but not limited to) sections 1981 and 1982.
The purpose of the Fees Act was simply to achieve consistency and to
provide generally for the award of attorney's fees in all federal civil
8. 118 CoNG. REc. 3373 (1972) (roll call vote).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
10. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 100.03.
11. Id. at 121.
12. See sources cited id. at 84 n.101.
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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rights actions. t4
Given this background, one can hardly infer either reliance on or
ratification of the Runyon doctrine from the passage of the Fees Act.
Reconsideration of the proper scope of civil rights legislation was
neither contemplated nor discussed; instead, Congress was intending
only to provide for the award of attorney's fees in whatever civil rights
actions happened to be available by statute. Eskridge's argument on
public reliance is thus unpersuasive.
Indeed, the best indications of congressional attitude toward the
Runyon doctrine point precisely in the opposite direction. To understand this point fully, one must first recognize that Jones itself was an
abrupt departure from prior law. For nearly a century prior to the
Jones decision, the Supreme Court had consistently expressed the view
that sections 1981 and 1982 applied only to discrimination by state
officials. ts The majority and dissent in Jones differed on the question
of whether any of the Court's previous pronouncements on the subject
could properly be viewed as controlling precedent;t 6 but however one
characterizes it, the language of prior decisions unequivocally takes
the position that the two sections were not intended to reach purely
private action.
It was against this background that Congress adopted the original
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act).t 7 The 1964 Act was a delicate compromise between factions holding a variety of competing
views on the civil rights issue and was passed only after a protracted,
often bitter political struggle. ts It is inconceivable that so much effort
would have been expended and so much blood shed had Congress believed that it was simply duplicating the efforts of the drafters of sections 1981 and 1982.
Even more importantly, the 1964 Act demonstrated that Congress
was unwilling to adopt a measure that embodied the Jones and Runyon
interpretations of sections 1981 and 1982. As adopted, the 1964 Act
was substantially less sweeping than those interpretations. A similar
result ensued in 1972, when Congress undertook a thorough review of
14. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5911-12.
15. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331
(1926); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18
(1879).
16. Compare Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-21 n.25, with Jones, 372 U.S. at 450-52 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, §§ 101-1106, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e17 (1982)).
18. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the 1964 Act, see Vass, Title VIL·
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965).

February 1989]

Correspondence

861

tQ.e scope of civil rights legislation. Although substantially strengthening the 1964 Act and declining to directly overrule Jones, Congress
once again refused to adopt the type of fiat ban on private racial discrimination embodied in Jones and Runyon. 19
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the present Congress
would be equally unwilling to adopt such a ban. Ironically, the best
evidence on this point comes from the amicus curiae brief filed by 66
Senators and US Representatives in Patterson - a brief urging the
Court to reaffirm the Runyon doctrine. The brief states that "[t]he
legislative effort necessary to restore [Runyon] would likely be fractious and divisive, since corrective legislation would, in all likelihood,
compel the Congress to address numerous peripheral questions concerning the scope and application of Section 1981.'_'2°
In essence, the members of Congress urge the Court to reaffirm
Runyon - even if wrongly decided initially- because it would be too
much trouble for them to legislate on the subject and (in any event)
they probably could not reenact the Runyon doctrine in its full scope.
I suppose that, in a sense, the position of the members' brief might be
characterized as reflecting a desire to rely on Runyon; however, it is
hardly the kind of reliance that should guide judicial decisionmaking.
In short, the idea of legislative ratification of or relianc~ on the
Runyon decision should not influence the Court's disposition of Patterson. Of course, the Court might conceivably reaffirm Runyon in any
event, relying either on the theory that the case was rightly decided
initially or that other aspects of the doctrine of stare decisis mitigate
against overruling. While in my view action on either of these grounds
would be a mistake, 21 it would at least not rest on a misconception of
the import of congressional inaction.

19. This argument is made in detail in the Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Patterson (No. 87-107) and the Brief for the Equal
Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Patterson (No. 87107).
20. Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States
House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Patterson (No. 87-107).
21. My views on this point may be found in Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Haus. L. REv. 221,
247-67 (1987).

